After Orbán's exit, is it finally time for the EU to rethink the unanimity rule in foreign policy? Inês Matias makes the case for change—and asks whether Europe's leaders are actually ready.
By Inês Matias
What if the problem with integration isn't your broken Swedish, but a society that has forgotten how to build community?
As Brussels proposes new rules for European manufacturing, can industrial competitiveness and economic security go hand in hand?
The occasional uncomfortable questions.
Is the EU prepared to abandon unanimous voting in foreign policy? Inês Matias examines the opportunity—and the obstacles—after Viktor Orbán's departure.
What if the problem with integration isn't your broken Swedish, but a society that has forgotten how to build community?
Less talking about people, more talking to them.
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Examining the policies, decisions and developments shaping Europe's future.
Europe is rethinking how it supports its industries. From public procurement to conditions on major foreign investments, the proposed Industrial Accelerator Act puts competitiveness, climate targets and economic sovereignty on the same agenda.
With Orbán out of office, the EU has an opportunity to rethink a foreign-policy system in which one government can hold up collective action. But changing the rules may be harder than changing the leadership.
The exit of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has created a unique opportunity for Europe to abandon a system that has long paralysed its foreign policy. The European Union operates under a unanimous voting system, where one country has veto power; however, the departure of Viktor Orbán, following sixteen years of governance defined by the use of the veto, marks the end of a major obstruction to the European Union’s collective action. The EUobserver opinion argues that this shift presents an opportunity to transition from unanimous voting to qualified majority voting within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
Originally conceived to safeguard the national sovereignty of member states, the veto has instead been used by some governments to pursue their own agendas. Orbán frequently leveraged this power to delay support for Ukraine and obstruct measures responding to human rights violations, contributing to a culture of self-censorship within the European External Action Service, which increasingly resorted to ambiguous statements to bypass potential blockades. Given the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP, this reform should be a priority on the European Council’s political agenda.
This state of affairs has profound implications for European integration. The current decision-making framework, designed for a more homogeneous post-Cold War order, struggles in a 27-member bloc exposed to a volatile international system. An enlarged Union in which a single country can paralyse collective action would face an even greater coordination challenge. Reform should therefore be discussed alongside future EU enlargement.
The EUobserver commentary points to the “passerelle clauses” provided for in Article 31 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) as a mechanism for introducing qualified majority voting on certain CFSP decisions without a full treaty revision. However, the legal feasibility of this proposal remains limited: triggering the relevant procedure itself demands unanimity, and national parliaments have a role in the treaty's safeguards. The focus thus shifts from the legal sphere to that of political will. Without Hungarian obstruction as an excuse, will national leaders choose to collaborate on a joint CFSP—or favour isolated action?
This transition becomes even more difficult when considering that the current unanimity model encourages parallel negotiations, a tactic frequently employed by Orbán, who strategically held up Council decisions to extract leverage in unrelated policy areas. With his departure, other member states might adopt similar strategies. Accordingly, the requirement of unanimity can disincentivise compromise in pursuit of the common interest. Smaller member states may also fear losing the veto as a safeguard against domination by larger powers, notably France and Germany, under qualified majority voting.
The post-Orbán scenario will test whether paralysis stemmed chiefly from Hungary or from a structural reluctance among member states to delegate sovereignty in the CFSP. Reform is needed if the EU wants to speak with greater consistency on the international stage. A fragmented Europe weakens its influence and allows powers such as Russia, the United States and China to exploit divisions among its members.
The European Commission wants public spending and strategic investment to strengthen Europe's industrial base. But can the bloc agree on what should count as “Made in EU”?
Economic competitiveness and strategic sovereignty currently stand as some of the greatest challenges facing the European Union (EU), forming the central theme of Mario Draghi's report, The Future of European Competitiveness. In that report, Draghi warns that the EU is losing ground in critical technological and industrial sectors, accumulating severe external dependencies that expose the bloc to geopolitical vulnerabilities.
While other global powers have adopted aggressive state-sponsored strategies, such as China's “Made in China 2025” or the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), Europe has historically lacked a strong, clear rule on Community preference. Simultaneously, EU companies face demanding sustainability targets and high energy costs that foreign competitors do not share. In response, the European Commission proposed “Made in EU” measures as part of a legislative package known as the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA). This initiative represents a broader EU effort to strengthen the competitiveness of local industries against producers abroad, while accelerating the decarbonisation of crucial sectors such as steel, aluminium and electric vehicles, and clean technologies such as batteries, solar, wind and nuclear.
The proposed “Made in EU” framework sets minimum local-content requirements for specified publicly funded projects and procurement, directing public authorities toward qualifying products manufactured in the EU. This would mark a shift away from an approach based exclusively on the lowest market price, redirecting public spending strategically toward economic security as part of a European industrial policy.
At the same time, the proposed law seeks to impose conditions on foreign direct investment (FDI) of at least €100 million in strategic sectors where a non-EU country holds more than 40% of global manufacturing capacity. Under these proposed rules, qualifying foreign investments would have to employ at least 50% EU workers, aiming to keep jobs and added value within European territory.
Under the Commission's proposed approach, “Made in EU” provisions would cover the EU's 27 member states, with certain provisions extending to European Economic Area partners such as Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. The framework could also extend to other countries with trade agreements, based on reciprocity and the conditions of the final legislation.
As a legislative proposal from the European Commission, the text still requires negotiation and approval by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union before it becomes law. Reaching agreement will be challenging, given that member states have differing views on the policy and may try to impose their own agendas. A joint approach with harmonised rules applied equally across the EU is therefore crucial to prevent fragmentation of the Single Market and safeguard credibility with investors.